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Abstract
This paper presents consideration of two public pension systems having a Dened Contribution
(DC) or a Dened Benet (DB) structure. The dierences between these two pension structures
are considerably important. In fact, DC benets for older people are changed according to a budget
under a constant contribution rate by younger people, but DB entails a contribution rate that changes
based on maintenance of a balanced budget, providing constant benets for older people. In addition,
this paper presents consideration of the child care of two types: one for the child care service and the
other for the child care time. The noteworthy result shows that the DB pension system derives the
multiple fertility if the child care is given by the time because of the contribution rate aects both
the household disposable income and opportunity cost to have children.
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1 Introduction
In some OECD countries, an aging society with fewer children poses severe diculties because of the
need for social security payments. A decrease in the number of younger people is expected to lead to a
shortage of revenues for social security transfers such as pensions and medical insurance. Governments
must consider Dened Contribution (DC) and the Dened Benet (DB) pension systems. For instance,
in Japan, the pension budget is managed as a DC system. A xed-benet pension system is regarded
as a DB system. Such pension systems x a benet and set payments to maintain a balanced budget.
By contrast, a xed payment pension system is regarded as a DC system. Such pension systems x the
payment and set the benet to maintain a balanced budget. It is crucially important to consider how a
pension system should be designed for an aging society with fewer children. Many studies have explored
this question.
Some related studies have examined endogenous fertility models, which derive fewer children endoge-
nously and which analyze pension systems such as DC. For instance, van Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam
(2003), van Groezen and Meijdam (2008), Yasuoka and Goto (2011), and Yasuoka and Goto (2015) con-
sider endogenous fertility models that x pension payments (that is, DC for which the benet depends
on the intergenerational population ratio) and insist on the necessity of a child allowance to raise fertility.
Wigger (1999) described a relation between the contribution rate and the growth of income per capita in
an endogenous fertility model that can be regarded as DC.
By contrast, some researchers have examined xed benet pensions such as DB. For example, in
Oshio and Yasuoka (2009), if younger people become fewer, then the burden of payment on each of them
becomes heavier. People will therefore be unable to gain sucient income to have children. For that
reason, the pension system is not sustainable in the long run because younger people decrease over time.
Without the heavy burden of payments for pensions, two steady states occur: fertility converges to a
steady state or zero. Moreover, Lin and Tian (2003), considering children as investment goods, examined
the relation between an increase in the pension benet nanced by a consumption tax and income per
capita in a xed benet pension system with an endogenous fertility model. Other studies have treated
children as investment goods (e.g., Nishimura and Zhang, 1992; Zhang and Zhang, 1998). Still others
have considered them as consumption goods (e.g., van Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam, 2003; Fanti and
Gori, 2009). The decision-making related to fertility diers between these models. The pension eects
on fertility also dier. Therefore, we should consider the basis of fertility even if DB is examined in
endogenous fertility model. Lin and Tian (2003) examined DB. However, Lin and Tian (2003) used a
fertility model with children cast not as consumption goods but as investment goods. The result derived
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by Lin and Tian (2003) is inapplicable to a fertility model incorporating children as consumption goods.
Therefore, it is important to examine DB in a fertility model that includes children as consumption goods.
Ono (2003) analyzed the pension system with public debt and a mortality rate applied during the
old period in an exogenous fertility model. Moreover, that study incorporated a pension system that
was balanced by public debt under both a xed contribution rate and a xed benet rate. The results
demonstrated how income per capita and the public debt stock are determined under such a pension
system.
The earlier studies described above posit no uncertainty for pension benets, but are instead perfect
foresight models. We think that it is desirable that a DB xes the benet level to allay uncertainty about
pension benets. Thereby, people can know their pension benet in advance. Therefore, we must analyze
how the pension system is desirable under uncertainty. In fact, some earlier studies of this question
persist. Borgmann (2005) considered the uncertainty generated by economic and population growth
and demonstrated which pension system (DC or DB) is desirable in terms of social welfare. Thgerson
(1998) demonstrated that a public pension system is better than the private pension system under wage
uncertainty. However, these models did not consider endogenous fertility.
The aims of this paper are to derive how fertility is determined. This paper presents consideration of
the pension system of two types: DC and DB. In addition, this paper presents consideration of the child
care of two types: one for child care services and the other for the child care time. The pension system
aects fertility through the household disposable income in the model of child care services. In addition
to this eect, the pension system aects the opportunity cost of rearing children, which in turn aects
fertility in the model of child care time. Because of this eect, DB in a model of child care time leads to
multiple fertility.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 of this paper establishes the model. Section 3
derives the equilibrium in the case of child care services. Section 4 derives the equilibrium in the case of
child care time. The nal section presents results.
2 The Model
This model economy consists of a two-period (young and old) overlapping generations model. Three
agents exist in this model: households, rms, and a government. In the following subsection, we explain
each agent.
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2.1 Households
Each household lives in two periods: young and old, and supplies labor to gain an income during the
young period. This model economy assumes that some child-care service or time is necessary to rear
children. In this model economy, we consider equilibrium of two types: one is the equilibrium with child
care time; the other is the equilibrium with child care service. In the model of child care time, the younger
people divide their time (unity) into child care time and labor supply. Then, the budget constraint are
given as
c1t +
c2t+1
1 + rt+1
= (1  t)(1  nt)wt + pt+11 + rt+1 : (1)
Therein, nt represents the number of children. The  unit time is necessary to rear a child (0 <  < 1);
then the labor time is reduced to 1   nt if the household has nt children. In addition, c1t and c2t+1
respectively denote consumption in young and old periods. Here, wt shows the unit time labor supply.
Interest rate 1 + rt+1 represents the return to savings. Younger people face contribution rate t for the
pension system. Older people receive pension benet pt+1.
In the model of child care service, younger people can provide full time for the labor supply, but they
must buy the child care service from the market. Assuming zt as the price for caring for a child, the
budget constraint is given as
ztnt + c1t +
c2t+1
1 + rt+1
= (1  t)wt + pt+11 + rt+1 : (2)
A household's utility function is assumed as
ut =  lnnt +  ln c1t + (1    ) ln c2t+1; 0 < ;  < 1; +  < 1: (3)
This function form is generally used in the endogenous fertility model.1
Under the budget constraint (1) in the model of child care time, households decide the allocations of
c1t, c2t+1 and nt to maximize their utility as
c1t = 

(1  t)wt + pt+11 + rt+1

; (4)
c2t+1 = (1    )(1 + rt+1)

(1  t)wt + pt+11 + rt+1

; (5)
nt =


(1  t)wt + pt+11+rt+1

(1  t)wt : (6)
Under budget constraint (2) in the model of child care service, households decide the allocations of
1This utility form is used by van Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam (2003) and others. This is the conventional form in an
endogenous fertility model with consumption goods.
4
c1t, c2t+1 and nt to maximize their utility as
c1t = 

(1  t)wt + pt+11 + rt+1

; (7)
c2t+1 = (1    )(1 + rt+1)

(1  t)wt + pt+11 + rt+1

; (8)
nt =


(1  t)wt + pt+11+rt+1

zt
: (9)
2.2 Firms
A representative rm produces nal good Yt with constant returns to scale or a neoclassical product
function, as shown by
Yt = F (Kt; Lt); FK > 0; FL > 0; FKK < 0; FLL < 0: (10)
The rm inputs capital stock Kt and labor Lt. With a perfectly competitive market, wage rate wt and
interest rate rt are shown as
wt = f(kt)  f 0(kt)kt; (11)
1 + rt = f 0(kt): (12)
In those equations, kt  KtLt and f(kt)  YtLt . The capital stock depreciates fully in one period.
In this model, there exists the child care service sector. Based on Yasuoka and Miyake (2010), we
assume Y ct = L
c
t as the child care service production function (0 < ). Here, Y
c
t and L
c
t respectively
denote the output of child care service and the labor input for child care service sector. Assuming free
labor mobility between the nal goods sector and child care service sector, the prot function t is
t = ztLct   wtLct : (13)
Then, the prot maximization derives the price of child care service as
zt =
wt

: (14)
2.3 Government
The government supplies two policies: one for pay-as-you-go pensions and the other for child allowances.
Moreover, we consider pension systems of two types: DC and DB.
Dened Contribution: DC This pension system xes the contribution rate for younger people (t =
) and determines the benet level for older people, which depends on the intergenerational population
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ratio, to hold a balanced budget. Considering the balanced budget, the budget constraint in the model
of child care time is shown as
Ntpt+1 = Nt+1(1  nt+1)wt+1 $ pt+1 = nt(1  nt+1)wt+1: (15)
In that equation, Nt and Nt+1 respectively denote the population size of older people in t + 1 period
(younger people in t period) and that of the younger people in t + 1 period. The intergenerational
population ratio is given as nt =
Nt+1
Nt
. Large nt, which represents the intergenerational population ratio,
increases the benet for older people. However, if households have many children, then the labor supply
decreases.
The government budget constraint in the model of child care service is
Ntpt+1 = Nt+1wt+1 $ pt+1 = ntwt+1: (16)
As shown by this equation, the child care time does not aect the pension benet for older people.
Dened Benet: DB This pension system xes the benet level for older people (pt+1 = pwt+1),
and determines the contribution rate for the younger people. Considering a balanced budget, the budget
constraint in the model of child care time is
Ntpwt+1 = t+1Nt+1(1  nt+1)wt+1 $ t+1 = p
nt(1  nt+1) : (17)
The greater number of younger people in t+ 1 period, which means large nt, decreases the contribution
rate. However, if the younger people have many children, then the contribution rate increases because of
the small labor supply.
The government budget constraint in the model of child care service is
Ntpwt+1 = t+1Nt+1wt+1 $ t+1 = p
nt
: (18)
As shown by this equation, the child care time does not aect the pension benet received by older
people. With a large population of younger people, the contribution rate is low.
3 Equilibrium in Child Care Service
This paper presents derivation of the equilibrium for a small open economy. Therefore, the interest rate is
given by an exogenous interest rate r; the wage rate w is also decided exogenously. This section presents
derivation of the fertility dynamics as the equilibrium in the model of child care service. However, there
exist pension systems of two types. We show the equilibrium of DC and DB.
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3.1 DC Case
Considering (9), (14), and (16), we can obtain fertility nt as
nt =
(1  )
1
   1+r
: (19)
Here, 1 >

1+r should be held to be positive nt. There is no dynamics of nt.
3.2 DB Case
Considering (9), (14) and (18), we can obtain fertility nt as
nt = 

1 +
p
1 + r
  p
nt 1

: (20)
For given nt 1, the fertility in t period nt is derived. The fertility dynamics of (20) can be portrayed as
the gure below.
[Insert Fig.1 around here.]
The solid line has two steady state equilibria: one for the stable steady state equilibrium and the other
for the unstable one. The dashed line has no steady state. With 

1 + p1+r
2
  4p  0, we can obtain
the steady state equilibrium.2
The results presented in this section are obtained using many related studies of the literature such as
those by van Groezen, Leers and Meijdam (2003), and by Fanti and Gori (2009).
4 Equilibrium in Child Care Time
This section presents derivation of the fertility dynamics as the equilibrium in the model of child care
time in the cases of DC and DB.
4.1 DC Case
Considering (6) and (15), we can obtain nt =


(1 )w+ nt(1 nt+1)w1+r

(1 )w , i.e.,
nt+1 =
1 + r


(1  )
nt
+

1 + r
  (1  )

: (21)
The dynamics of (21) shows an up sloping curve as portrayed in Fig. 2.
[Insert Fig.2 around here.]
2Assuming the steady state n = nt = nt+1, we can obtain n2   
 
1 + p
1+r

n + p = 0. Then, n =

 
1+
p
1+r


q
22
 
1+
p
1+r
2 4p
2
is obtainable if 22
 
1 + p
1+r
2   4p > 0.
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As shown in Fig. 2, the dynamics of (21) has the positive steady state equilibrium. However, this
steady state is not always locally stable. With dnt+1dnt =  
(1+r)(1 )
n2 >  1, the steady state is the locally
stable one.
4.2 DB Case
Considering (6) and (17), we can obtain nt+1 =


1  p
nt(1 nt+1)

w+ pw1+r


1  p
nt(1 nt+1)

w
, i.e.,
2ntn
2
t+1   

1 + +
p
1 + r

nt   p

nt+1   

p 

1 +
p
1 + r

nt

= 0: (22)
Then, the fertility nt+1 can be derived as
nt+1 =


1 + + p1+r

nt   p


r
2

1 + + p1+r

nt   p
2
+ 42ntp

p 

1 + p1+r

nt

22nt
: (23)
Obtaining two positive nt+1
2

1 + +
p
1 + r

nt   p
2
+ 42ntp

p 

1 +
p
1 + r

nt

> 0 (24)
requires positive nt. With
42ntp

p 

1 +
p
1 + r

nt

< 0; (25)
we can obtain two multiple nt+1 for nt, i.e., the multiple equilibrium. Then, the following proposition
can be established.
Proposition 1 In the model of child care time with a DB pension, if (24) and (25) are held, then two
positive fertility nt+1 can be derived for nt.
Why can multiple equilibria be derived? The reason is given by the child care time with DB pension.
If nt+1 is large, then the contribution rate  = pnt(1 nt+1) remains high because of a small 1   nt+1.
This eect reduces the household disposable income, which reduces fertility. However,  = pnt(1 nt+1)
aects the opportunity cost of rearing children, and the cost of child care time is small. Consequently,
the household wants to have more children. Then, high fertility nt+1 can be achieved.
However, if nt+1 is small, then the contribution rate  = pnt(1 nt+1) is low. This eect raises fertility.
However, a low contribution rate means high child care costs because of the high opportunity cost of
rearing children. Then, low fertility nt+1 can be achieved.
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If the steady state exists, then the locally stable condition is given as  1 < dnt+1dnt < 1.
dnt+1
dnt
is given
by
dnt+1
dnt
=
n

1 + + p1+r

  2n2   

1 + p1+r

22n2   

1 + + p1+r

n  
 : (26)
5 Conclusions
This paper sets the endogenous fertility model with pay-as-you-go pension and examines how the pension
system aects fertility. If the household can use child care services, then the DC pension gives no dynamics
of fertility. With the DB pension, the fertility uctuates over time. However, if the household cannot
use child care services, then the household should use the time for rearing children. Therefore, because
of the change of the labor supply, the fertility dynamics is complicated. Especially in the DB case, there
exist multiple equilibria: Multiple fertility can be derived because the contribution rate aects not only
the household disposable income but also the opportunity cost of rearing children.
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